Elliot Aronson (1968, 1999) took a different approach to modifying dissonance theory. Unlike Cooper and Fazio's view, Aronson reaffirmed the position that inconsistency is the primary cause of dissonance, but only an inconsistency of a particular type. In order for inconsistency to arouse dissonance, it must implicate the self-concept. At its center, he argued that dissonance was a theory about the self. People strive for consistent views of themselves. If people feel reasonably positive about themselves, they see themselves as competent and moral human beings. Anything that challenges that view will result in dissonance. Cognitive inconsistency results in dissonance because good, competent, and moral people do not usually act in ways that run contrary to their beliefs. They do not convince other students that a dull task is interesting, they do not extol the virtues of marijuana to high school youngsters, they do not write essays about raising college tuition fees if they believe that the fees should not be raised. When people find that they have acted in ways that compromise their sense of competence or moral integrity, they are motivated to change their attitudes. If you have written an essay arguing for increased college fees, then your view of yourself as a moral and competent person will be compromised, unless you convince yourself that you actually believe that position.
One implication of the self-consistency position is that people who do not chronically think of themselves as competent would not be as likely to change their attitudes following counterattitudinal behavior. That is, people with lower self-esteem should experience little dissonance after behaving in a counterattitudinal fashion. Self-esteem establishes an expectancy about how a person is likely to behave. When people violate that expectancy, dissonance is created. Several pieces of evidence converge to support this viewpoint. Aronson and Mettee (1968) manipulated what people thought about themselves. Those whose self-esteem had been lowered were less bothered by an attitude-discrepant act than were people whose self-esteem had been raised. Similarly, Glass (1964), Maracek and Mettee (1972), and Gibbons, Eggleston, and Benthin (1997) also found that dissonance arousal was lower for people with low self-esteem.
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) directly manipulated what people expected of themselves on a particular task. They led people to believe that
I they were either highly competent or highly incompetent at a social perception task. They found that people were bothered by any behavior that was at variance with what they had come to expect of themselves: Those who felt they were incompetent at social perception were more bothered by success than by failure. Those who had a positive sense of their ability were more bothered by their failure. In short, Aronson's view is that behavior that calls into question one's competence and morality, such as advocating something you do not believe in, creates cognitive dissonance, provided you expect positive outcomes for yourself-that is, that you have a positive sense of self-esteem.
Self-Affirmation
Claude Steele and his colleagues (e.g., Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) have also linked the experience of dissonance to a person's self-esteem. Like the self-consistency position, the selfaffirmation view of dissonance holds that people are primarily motivated to affirm the competence and morality of their self-view. However, selfaffirmation makes a drastically different prediction when it comes to the role of self-esteem. Steele et al. (1993) argued that people with low selfesteem are the ones who feel particularly threatened when they eng!lge in counterattitudinal behavior. Their self-view is already fragile, and acting in a counterattitudinal fashion further compromises their sense of competence. On the other hand, a solid sense of self-esteem can serve as a resource-a buffer against the feeling of incompetence. Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) found that when people with high self-esteem engage in counterattitudinal behavior, they change their attitudes less than do people with low self-esteem. This, of course, is opposite to the prediction made by the self-consistency view.
TOWARD A RESOLUTION: THE SELF-STANDARDS MODEL OF DISSONANCE
At least four models of dissonance have been active contenders to be the most accurate and complete explanation of the process that underlies dissonance effects. Two of the theories implicate the self as integral parts of the dissonance formula, but each makes different predictions about the way that the strength of self-esteem projects onto the magnitude of dissonance. The new look model of dissonance and the original model offered by Brehm (1956) and by Festinger (1957) make no such presuppositions for the self. The importance of behavioral consequences for the arousal of dissonance plays the most prominent role in the new look model, but is the authorities to implement unhelpful and uncompassionate policies. Thus, consistent with the new look and original models of dissonance, they experienced dissonance, changed their attitudes-and their level of self-esteem had nothing to do with it.
"So?" The Art of Going Forward
I have presented the self-standard model in this tribute to Jack Brehm because I think it is consistent with his influence on me and on the field of social psychology. Jack viewed dissonance theory, as he viewed so many of the theoretical advances for which he is responsible, as part of a wider network of motivational phenomena that affect people as they interact with their social environment. He has always emphasized expanding theory, rather than restricting it, synthesizing approaches whenever possible. In the self-standards model, Stone and I hope to cast dissonance in a more inclusive, synthesizing framework. A good squabble that pits one version of dissonance theory against another can be productive and profitable. We learn much crucial information in the course of resolving the squabble. But, we have now learned enough about the role of the self in dissonance to synthesize the theories and ask the more difficult questions about the cognitive processing that sometimes, but not always, implicates the self in the arousal of dissonance. The SSM is one such model that seeks a synthesis and that incorporates several different views under one motivational umbrella.
It should come as no surprise that there are issues left unresolved. The SSM helps us understand why the self is sometimes involved in dissonance and sometimes not. It posits that all dissonance emanates from the same judgment: How shall I interpret the behavior I have chosen, and against what standard of judgment shall I make this interpretation? Dissonance is activated by an assessment of whether I have done something unwanted or aversive. However, the question of what is aversive has been expanded. It can be aversive because it violates my sense of what I expect of myself, or it can be aversive because it violates my normative judgment of what most people consider to be unwanted or immoral. |
